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Two Volumes, Pp. xlii, 951. $30
The author of State Administrative Law has taught administrative
Jaw at the University of Michigan for a number of years while engaged
in practice in Detroit. He is the author of two earlier books on adminis-
trative law and co-editor, with Dean Emeritus E. Blythe Stason, of a
casebook on administrative law. He has written his new book as a re-
search project of the American Bar Foundation and the University of
Michigan Law School.
Professor Cooper's book is a welcome addition. The field of admin-
istrative law has been dominated for some time by Professor Davis'
treatise.1 One would not want to teach or practice administrative law
without having that work available, but there has been a need for com-
plementary works. Although Professor Davis includes sections dealing
with state law, his emphasis is on federal law. Thus a new work dealing
primarily with state law will be helpful.
Professor Cooper's treatise is conveniently arranged and written for
those who want information about a specific problem in administrative
law. It seems to cover the full range of topics usually considered in
Anglo-American administrative law. The table of contents is detailed and
complete, indicating specific sections which deal with particular types
of cases.
Administrative law often provides more questions than answers.
Professor Davis states his views forcefully and, to this reviewer, often
persuasively. It is helpful to have another relatively complete book
which will sometimes present different opinions. Generally, Professor
Cooper's approach is descriptive of the law rather than philosophical or
argumentative. He states on page 538: "Since the state courts are little
given to theorizing as to what interests must appear to confer standing
to appeal, the following discussion will not attempt any detailed legalistic
analysis of the principles involved, but will rather be devoted principally
to an examination of the results reached in certain typical situations."
In particular instances, however, Professor Cooper does offer his
own views. On page 536 he states that section 10(a) of the Federal Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act adopts the test of "legal wrong" as the cri-
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terion of standing to appeal, while recognizing in a footnote that this
construction is open to argument. This opinion differs from that of Pro-
fessor Davis, who maintains that the Act permits one who is adversely
affected in fact to obtain review.
2
One of the principal functions of Professor Cooper's book is to pre-
sent and explain the Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act.
The Act appears in an appendix, with the comments of the drafting com-
mittee. It is also quoted and discussed where relevant throughout the
treatise. Thus, this book will be useful both in states which adopt the
Act and in others which are considering adopting either a general statute
on administrative procedure or statutes creating rules of procedure for
specific agencies.
The reader should note that the merit of various provisions of the
Revised Model Act is arguable. For example, the Act provides in section
10(1) that:
The rules of evidence as applied in [non-jury] civil cases in the
[District Courts of this State] shall be followed. When necessary to
ascertain facts not reasonably susceptible of proof under those rules,
evidence not admissible thereunder may be admitted (except where
precluded by statute) if it is of a type commonly relied on by rea-
sonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs.
Professor Davis has pointed out that no distinct rules of evidence for
non-jury cases exist.3 Professor Cooper acknowledges this and explains
that the Act does not mean there are such rules, but only that the rules
of evidence shall be used as applied in non-jury cases. Perhaps it would be
better to use a provision simply permitting state agencies to admit and
rely on such evidence as reasonably prudent men commonly rely on in
the conduct of their affairs. Cooper's explanation seems overly-sophis-
ticated for many members of state agencies.
This reviewer will keep Professor Cooper's treatise at hand while
teaching administrative law and will refer to it when drafting or criticiz-
ing proposed legislation relating to administrative agencies. He believes
that it will also be a useful addition to the library of any practitioner who
works with administrative agencies.
LESTER R. RUSOFF.*
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